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1. Introduction 
The use of racial preferences in admissions decisions at postsecondary institutions has 
ignited contentious political and socioeconomic debate. Proponents of “affirmative action” 
programs maintain that increased racial diversity at colleges and universities benefit White and 
Asian (nonminority) students and promotes the equitable treatment of historically disadvantaged 
minority groups. In his 1965 commencement address at Howard University, President Lyndon B. 
Johnson memorably captured affirmative action’s raison d'être: “You do not take a person who, 
for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race 
and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe that you have 
been completely fair.” In a landmark 1978 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of affirmative action programs in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that race-sensitive policies do not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).  
Today, however, African American and Hispanic (minority) students are still 
underrepresented in higher education and graduate at lower rates than their nonminority 
counterparts (Figures 1 and 2).1 Critics have advanced the hypothesis that affirmative action 
programs can hurt their intended beneficiaries by causing them to enroll in institutions for which 
they are underprepared. Minorities who are “overmatched” subsequently graduate at lower rates 
than they would have if they had matriculated at less-selective institutions that better matched their 
academic credentials. This is known as the “mismatch hypothesis.”  
 
1 Throughout this paper, I use the term “minority” to refer to African American and Hispanic students because these 
two racial groups are classified as “historically underrepresented minorities” by the University of California, 
University of Texas, and other institutions of higher-education. This terminology is consistent with Card and Kruger 
(2005), Loury and Garman (1993, 1995), Hinrichs (2012, 2014), and Hill (2017). 
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Figure 1: Graduation Rate Distributions 
by Racial Group 
Figure 2: Graduation Rates by Ban Regime  
and College Selectivity 
 
 
Since Bakke, several states have enacted – via voter initiative or judicial fiat – statewide 
bans on the use of racial preferences in admissions decisions. Table 1 shows the development and 
(at times) declension of statewide affirmative action bans in the United States. Strikingly, these 
racial preference rollbacks seem to effectuate haphazardly across space and time. I exploit this 
quasi-experimental, plausibly exogenous variation in racial preference ban adoption to inform the 
contentious public policy debate on affirmative action.  
This paper endeavors to empirically evaluate the mismatch hypothesis by identifying the 
causal impact of affirmative action bans on minority graduation rates over a twenty-year period. 
To the extent statewide affirmative action bans vary across space and time, they allow for the study 
of affirmative action programs using a difference-in-difference framework. If the mismatch 
hypothesis is correct, racial preference bans should alleviate overmatch effects and increase 
minority graduation rates. An alternative hypothesis posits that affirmative action helps propel 
minorities into higher quality colleges where graduating within four years is the expectation and 
the norm. If these “college quality” effects dominate, minority graduation rates should decrease 
after statewide racial preference bans.  
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Table 1: Affirmative Action Bans and Percentage Plans by State 
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Texas2 X X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T T T,A T,A T,A T,A T,A T,A T,A T,A T,A T,A 
California3  X X X X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T 
Washington   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Florida4     X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T X,T 
Georgia5      X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Michigan6          X X X X X ? ? ? X 
Nebraska            X X X X X X X 
Arizona              X X X X X 
New Hampshire                X X X 
Oklahoma                 X X 
 
Key: X = Affirmative action ban; T = “Top-X” percent guaranteed admissions program; ? = Uncertainty due to ban 
enacted but ruled unconstitutional, but ban later reinstated; A = Affirmative action program reintroduced after ban 
ruled unconstitutional and not later reinstated 
This paper follows the work of Hill (2017), Hinrichs (2012, 2014), and Backes (2012) in 
examining the aggregate effect of affirmative action bans using a difference-in-difference 
approach. However, this paper examines the effect of racial preference bans on minority 
graduation rates instead of enrollment and is the first to disaggregate mismatch effects by major 
category and college selectivity on a national scale. This is important because no previous literature 
has ascertained whether mismatch is confined to STEM majors at highly selective institutions.7 
 
2 Ban established by Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). Overturned by the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The University of Texas at 
Austin reintroduced affirmative action for its fall 2005 admissions cycle. Texas House Bill 588 guaranteed admission 
to a public campus of the student’s choice for the top 10% of any high school class. 
3 Following the enactment of Proposition 209, a voter initiative, California banned affirmative action starting with 
the 1998 entering class. In 2001, it implemented an “Eligibility in the Local Context Program,” which guaranteed 
admission to a University of California (UC) campus for the top 12.5% of California public high school graduates. 
This number was later reduced down to 9% and other requirements were added. 
4 Governor Jeb Bush banned the use of racial preferences in admissions decisions and established the “Talented 20” 
guaranteed-admissions program in his One Florida Initiative (Executive Order 99-281, 1999). 
5 Only affecting the University of Georgia. 
6 Gratz and Grutter disallowed the use of a “points system” to boost minority enrollment at the University of Michigan. 
Michigan voters then passed the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (Proposal 2), amending the Michigan Constitution 
to ban affirmative action in 2006. The proposal was ruled unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
2011. However, in April 2014 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and reinstated the ban in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014). This case established the legal right of states to ban 
affirmative action in public universities. 
7 Hill (2017), Backes (2012), and Hinrichs (2012) find that affirmative action bans decrease minority enrollment but 
are unable to disentangle mismatch and college quality effects. Hill (2017) confines his analyze to STEM majors 
and Hinrichs (2012) disaggregated by college selectivity, but neither disaggregates results by both college selectivity 
and major category. 
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Using a comprehensive sample of institutions, I examine whether affirmative action rollbacks 
increase minority graduation rates and in what major categories (if any) are mismatch effects 
prevalent. My results suggest that racial preference bans increase minority graduation rates at 
highly selective public colleges, corroborating Arcidiacono et. al (2014), Loury and Garman (1993, 
1995), Hinrichs (2014), and Sowell (2004) on a national scale. However, my results diverge from 
Cortes (2010) and Hill (2017). Interestingly, my results suggest that mismatch effects are not 
confined to STEM fields – they are present in the Social Sciences as well, albeit to a lesser extent. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of private colleges and affirmed by the construction of 
synthetic control states.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous empirical 
literature on mismatch, Section 3 describes the data source used, Section 4 presents this paper’s 
empirical strategy, Section 5 reveals results, Section 6 probes robustness, and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Only the top 20 to 30 percent of four-year colleges use racial preferences in admissions 
decisions, as most schools simply are not selective enough to afford the use of affirmative action 
programs (Bowen and Bok, 1998; Kane, 1998; Arcidiacono, 2005). Within these selective colleges, 
there is a substantial gap in academic preparation between minority and nonminority matriculants 
(Baker, 2019). Minorities frequently and persistently graduate at lower rates than their nonminority 
counterparts (Figure 2). 
Affirmative action policies can impact minority graduation rates through two distinct 
mechanisms. The mismatch hypothesis predicts that banning affirmative action could better match 
students to the institutions where they enroll, thereby increasing minority college graduation rates. 
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However, an expanding literature suggests that college quality and collegiate resources each exert 
a separate influence on degree completions independent of mismatch effects. Bound and Turner 
(2007) developed the insight that college resources are relatively inelastic and do not respond pari 
passu to short-run demand shocks in enrollment. They use Census data on the size of each “birth 
cohort” in a state for a particular graduating class as an instrument for enrollment demand and 
discover that graduation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the size of the birth cohort. 
This finding, which the authors term “cohort crowding,” indicates that collegiate resources matter 
for degree attainment.  
Loury and Garman (1993, 1995) conducted some of the earliest studies on mismatch. Using 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the Class of 1972, Loury and Garman (1993) used 
a selection-on-observables approach and find that some students attending the most selective 
colleges would have higher earnings if they had attended less selective schools. They interpret 
their findings as evidence for “mismatch effects” and inaugurated the term into the economics 
literature. Light and Strayer (2000) extend this work by estimating graduation rates based on 
performance on Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) using a multinomial probit model. They 
find that graduation rates deteriorate monotonically among the bottom 25% of test-takers as 
college quality increases. For those that score higher on the AFQT, the trend largely reverses. 
These findings suggest that policies inducing low-ability students to attend higher-quality schools 
are counterproductive in terms of graduation.  
There is no consensus in the literature about the effects of racial preference bans on 
minority degree attainment. Researchers using a difference-in-difference approach have reached 
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different conclusions with different datasets.8 Hinrichs (2012) uses American Community Survey 
data and finds that affirmative action does not impact the average student, but minority students 
“cascade down” from more selective schools to less selective ones as a result of racial preference 
bans. Hinrichs (2014) conducted follow-up studies using data from the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) and found that racial preference bans have no effect on minority 
graduation rates. Cortes (2010) examined the effect of affirmative action bans in Texas using 
micro-level data from a sample of public and private universities. She finds that affirmative action 
bans decrease minority six-year graduation rates by 2.7 to 4.0 percentage points. This would 
indicate that college-quality effects dominate mismatch effects. 9  Arcidiacono et. al (2014) 
examined the effects of Proposition 209 in California using confidential micro-data from the 
University of California (UCOP data). They find that California’s statewide affirmative action ban 
caused minority graduation rates to increase by 4 percentage points.  
Affirmative action bans may not be exogenous shocks to racial preferences in 
undergraduate admissions. For instance, eliminating affirmative action may change applicants’ 
behavior. Affirmative action bans may make minorities feel unwelcome and dissuade them from 
applying to college, or it may induce minority applications if minorities believe the signaling value 
of a college degree increases after racial preference bans.10 However, Card and Krueger (2005), 
using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy and confidential micro-data from California 
 
8 It may be the case that college-quality and mismatch effects are equal in strength and generally offset each other, 
as Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2016) and Dillon and Smith (2017) argue.  
9 However, Cortes finds that the decline can be explained in part by the “Texas Top 10 Percent” guaranteed 
admissions rule, which more likely impacted top-decile students unaffected by the ban than drove down completion 
rates for lower-ranked students.   
10 In Affirmative Action Around the World, Thomas Sowell examines the implementation of affirmative action in 
other countries, such as India, where admissions are based only on observed factors such as test scores. Using four 
different case studies, Sowell finds that affirmative action bans may induce “[t]he redesignation of individuals and 
groups, in order to receive the benefits of preferences and quotas intended for others” (Sowell 2004, 190). 
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and Texas, find no change in minority SAT score-sending behavior (which they use as a proxy for 
minority application patterns) after affirmative action bans. A related issue is that minority students 
may be transferring from “more difficult” majors (such as STEM) to “less difficult” ones (such as 
the humanities) following admission to selective colleges for which they are underprepared.11 To 
address this concern, Hill (2017) uses a difference-in-difference model and IPEDS data to examine 
the effect of racial preference bans on minority degree completions in STEM fields only. Hill finds 
that affirmative action bans did not significantly decrease the number of minority STEM graduates 
at highly selective colleges. However, Hill examines neither minority graduation rates nor fields 
other than STEM. In addition, Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2016) uses UCOP data to determine 
that minorities in STEM at UC Berkeley and UCLA with less academic preparation than their 
peers would have higher graduation rates if they had attended a less selective UC campus. 
This paper relies on methodological guidance from Hill (2017), Hinrichs (2012, 2014), and 
Backes (2012) in examining the aggregate effect of affirmative action bans on minority graduation 
rates using a difference-in-difference approach. This paper is the first to distinguish between 
STEM and non-STEM majors as well as between selective and unselective colleges at the national 
level using a 1997-2017 dataset.  
3. Data 
The data for this paper comes from IPEDS by the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES). The IPEDS database encompasses all Title IV institutions in the United States and 
provides rich data on each institution from 1997 to 2017. As mandated by the Higher Education 
Act of 1965, IPEDS reports cohort graduation rates for all full-time, first-time students at 
 
11 For example, Arcidiacono et. al (2012) find that Blacks have lower persistence rates in the Natural Sciences, 
Mathematics, Engineering, and Economics than Whites, and Blacks with initial interest in these fields are more 
likely to switch to majors in the humanities or social sciences. 
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institutions where students receive federal student aid. I drop all institutions without data across 
all years in the sample (such as UC Merced, established in 2005).12 The full sample is a balanced 
panel dataset. Initially, only public four-year colleges are included in the sample. Private four-year 
colleges unaffected by affirmative action bans are later reinstated as an additional control group 
for a robustness check. For accounting purposes, summary statistics detailing sample and 
subsample sizes (by number of institutions and selectivity) are presented in Table 2 below. This 
paper uses aggregate data from IPEDS and thereby treats the university as the unit of observation.  
Table 2: Institutional Level Descriptive Statistics by Selectivity 
Panel A: 
Public 
Institutions 
All 
Institutions 
Non-Ban States   Ban States 
All 
Institutions 
Highly 
Selective 
Moderately 
Selective 
Unselective   
All 
Institutions 
Highly 
Selective 
Moderately 
Selective 
Unselective 
Institutions 499 407 29 33 345   92 17 14 61 
Number of Observations: 10479 
Panel B: 
Public and 
Private 
Institutions 
All 
Institutions 
Non-Ban States   Ban States 
All 
Institutions 
Highly 
Selective 
Moderately 
Selective 
Unselective   
All 
Institutions 
Highly 
Selective 
Moderately 
Selective 
Unselective 
Institutions 1360 1122 99 94 929   238 26 33 179 
Number of Observations: 28,560 
 
Notes: Number of public four-year institutions in each respective sample and subsample. Racial preferences used only 
at the top 20% of institutions in the United States (Bowen and Bok, 1998; Arcidiacono, 2005). Accordingly, “Highly 
Selective” institutions are defined as those within the top decile of admissions selectivity, “Moderately Selective” 
institutions are those between the tenth and twentieth percentile, and “Unselective” institutions are those in the bottom 
eighty percent of undergraduate admission rates. 
 
 
Figure 2 graphs six-year graduation rates for minorities and nonminorities under ban and 
nonban regimes by admissions selectivity. Following methodological guidance from Hinrichs 
(2014, 48), I examine six-year instead of four-year  graduation rates because “many students who 
graduate do not graduate in four years,” and “many students graduate in six years.” Students at 
 
12 I also drop historically black colleges and universities and all institutions where enrollment numbers by racial 
group do not sum to overall enrollment. In models restricted to public institutions, I drop all institutions that are not 
coded as four-year public institutions in every year of the sample. 
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selective institutions graduate at higher rates than their peers at less selective schools. The gap 
between minority and nonminority graduation rates remains roughly constant across time in all 
four panels; minority students consistently graduate at lower rates than their nonminority 
counterparts, but graduation rates trended upwards at a slightly faster rate for minority students in 
ban states vis-à-vis nonban states. The gap between minority and nonminority graduation rates is 
larger at unselective institutions in nonban states than selective institutions in nonban states.13 
A potential limitation of the IPEDS database is that the NCES only surveys institutions 
where students receive federal student aid (e.g., Federal Pell Grants, Perkins Loans, Ford Direct 
Student Loans, etc.). However, this group includes most institutions in the United States, since 
around two-thirds of all college and university students receive federal student aid (NCES, 2015-
16). According to the NCES, more than 7,500 institutions complete IPEDS surveys each year, 
including “research universities, state colleges and universities, private religious and liberal arts 
colleges, [and] for-profit institutions.”14  Moreover, some non-Title-IV institutions voluntarily 
report data to IPEDS. Another limitation of the IPEDS database is that IPEDS includes only first-
time, full-time students enrolled in a degree program. This omits a sizable share of the population 
currently attending college, but still encompasses most students affected by affirmative action 
programs (Hinrichs, 2014, 46). As shown in Table 2, the full sample follows over two hundred 
private and public institutions in ban states and over one-thousand institutions in nonban states 
over twenty years, amounting to over twenty-thousand observations.  
 
 
13 Table 6 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics of the entire sample for variables used in the regression 
specifications below. Further descriptive statistics disaggregated by subsample and the major-classification scheme 
used by the College Board are presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
14 “About IPEDS.” (2020, May 1). Retrieved from https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/about-ipeds 
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4. Model and Empirical Strategy 
The effect of a statewide affirmative action ban for each racial group at public university i 
in state s in year t is estimated using the following difference-in-difference model: 
𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑠,𝑡−6 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗) +  ∑ 𝛿𝑗(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗) + 𝑢𝑖
3
𝑗 =1
+  𝜂𝑠𝑡 +  𝑖𝑠𝑡  
3
𝑗 =1
 (1) 
The dependent variable g is graduation rates within 150% of normal time (6 years). The 
independent variable ban is a binary variable indicating whether state s has banned affirmative 
action by the time of enrollment in year t, ui are university level fixed effects, ηst are linear state-
level graduation rate trends, εsit is a disturbance, and βj is the parameter of interest. 15  This 
specification includes year-by-selectivity fixed effects yeart × Selj, where Sel codes for selectivity 
and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, corresponding to highly selective (1), moderately selective (2), and unselective 
(3) colleges. The treated group is comprised of institutions under ban regimes in applicable ban 
states, and the control group is comprised of public institutions in nonban states.  
Cortes (2010), Long (2004), and Hinrichs (2014) show that percentage plan (top-x) 
programs designed in response to – and intended to ameliorate the negative effects of – racial 
preference bans impact minority graduate rates. Additionally, statewide politics may affect the 
minority college search and application process prior to matriculation and graduation. For example, 
statewide affirmative action bans may make minorities feel unwelcome and thereby deter them 
from applying to selective colleges. Hence, equation (2) introduces unique regressors controlling 
for a “ban discussion period” and whether an affirmative action ban was enacted by voter initiative 
(as opposed to a court decision or executive action). 16 The ban discussion period dummy controls 
 
15 The variable ban is the product of two dummy variables: ban = Ban_Enactment * After 
16 The affirmative action ban discussion period is defined as the length of time in between either of the following 
two events and the enactment of the ban: (1) the commencement of petition-gathering for a voter initiative, or (2) 
initial filings in litigation that would eventually arise in a court decision that bans affirmative action. For example: in 
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for the duration and timing of a period in which discussion of an affirmative action ban was 
potentially present in the discourse surrounding racial justice or educational policy in a state. The 
main insight of this specification is that statewide political rhetoric affects minority graduation 
rates. A model controlling for “top-x” percent programs, “ban-discussion” periods, and whether 
the ban was implemented by a voter initiative is: 
𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑠,𝑡−6 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗)
3
𝑗 =1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗(𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑋𝑠,𝑡−6 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗) +
3
𝑗 =1
∑ 𝛿𝑗(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗)
3
𝑗 =1
+ ∑ 𝜙𝑗(𝑑𝑠(𝑡−𝜆) × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗) +
3
𝑗 =1
𝑣𝑠𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖 +  𝜂𝑠𝑡 +  𝑖𝑠𝑡   
(2) 
In this specification, topX is a dummy variable indicating whether state s had implemented 
a percentage plan guaranteed admissions program at the time of enrollment. The binary variable v 
indicates whether there was an affirmative action ban implemented as a result of a voter-led 
initiative in state s at in year t. This is not the case in Texas and Georgia, where an affirmative 
action ban was implemented by the Hopwood decision, and Florida, where it was implemented by 
executive action. The variable 𝑑 denotes whether discussion of a statewide affirmative action ban 
was in the statewide political discourse in the 𝜆 years preceding the ban. For equations (1) and (2): 
if the mismatch hypothesis is correct, then, ceteris paribus, 
𝜕𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝑏𝑎𝑛
=  𝛽𝑗 > 0.  If college quality 
effects dominate, then, all else equal,  
𝜕𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝜕𝑏𝑎𝑛
=  𝛽𝑗 < 0. 
 
California, the UC Regents discussed the idea of an affirmative action ban from 1996 to 1998, when a rollback was 
enacted via Proposition 206 – hence the ban discussion period is between 1996 and 1998. In Texas, litigation that 
would eventually arise in Hopwood commenced in 1994, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion 1996, and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari that same year. Hence, the Texas ban discussion period is from 1994 to 1996. Executive 
actions initiated unilaterally by a state governor are assumed to have a 1-year discussion period. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Effects of Bans on Overall Graduation Rates 
Table 3 presents results from specifications (1) and (2). At selective public institutions in 
specification (2), affirmative action bans increase minority but do not change nonminority 
graduation rates, consistent with the mismatch hypothesis. Without controls, the effect is not 
statistically significant for Hispanics at the 95% confidence level. Holding all else constant, racial 
preference bans are predicted to increase Black graduation rates by 3.7 percentage points and 
Hispanic graduation rates by 5.2 percentage points on average. Results are statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. It is notable that mismatch effects are only significant at the most 
selective postsecondary institutions in the United States.  
Table 3: Effect of Affirmative Action Bans on Degree Attainment Rates by Racial Group, Public Only 
  Racial Group 
Specification:  (1)  (2) 
Variables and Controls All White Asian Black Hispanic  White Asian Black Hispanic 
Ban × Highly Selective 0.0194 -0.00398 0.0149 0.0429*** 0.0406*  -0.00776 0.00763 0.0365** 0.0519** 
(0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0232) (0.00914) (0.0227)  (0.00678) (0.0168) (0.0147) (0.0221) 
Ban × Moderately 
Selective 
0.00654 -0.00528 0.0293 0.0273 0.0182  0.00658 0.0482 0.0508 0.0335* 
(0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0408) (0.0213) (0.0256)  (0.0164) (0.0390) (0.0315) (0.0175) 
Ban × Unselective -0.00463 -0.00797 0.00661 -0.000983 0.00466  -0.00822 0.00384 0.00286 0.0118 
(0.00398) (0.00521) (0.0116) (0.00686) (0.00427)  (0.00496) (0.00753) (0.00733) (0.0115) 
State Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Percentage Plan Controls Yes No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Voter Initiative Controls Yes No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Discussion Period 
Controls 
Yes No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.411 0.224 0.069 0.111 0.080  0.356 0.080 0.116 0.089 
Number of Observations 10,479 
Number of Institutions 499 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is graduation rates by racial group and 
institutional selectivity after affirmative action bans. Year-by-selectivity and institution fixed effects are absorbed for 
all specifications. “Highly Selective” institutions are defined as those in the top 10% of selectivity by undergraduate 
admission rates, “Moderately Selective” as those in the top 10-20%, and “Unselective” in the bottom 80%. 
Specification (1) lacks ban-related controls, specification (2) includes these controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Affirmative action bans have no statistically significant impact on minority or nonminority 
graduation rates at moderately selective or unselective colleges at the 95% confidence level. This 
affirms previous empirical findings that only selective institutions can “afford” to practice 
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affirmative action. The inclusion of controls pertaining to potential latent effects of racial 
preference bans on minorities beyond the use of racial preferences in admissions decisions – 
whether a ban was implemented as a result of a voter initiative and the length of a “ban discussion” 
period prior to ban enactment – does not change the sign of the estimate but increases its power 
for Hispanics. However, these controls reduce the estimated size of mismatch effects by 0.6 
percentage points for African Americans and increase the estimated size of mismatch effects by 
1.1 percentage points for Hispanics, suggesting that Percentage Plan, Voter Initiative, and Ban 
Discussion effects explain some of the variation in minority graduation rates. Gubernatorial or 
statewide political rhetoric matters, for instance, if affirmative action bans embody a general shift 
in racial attitudes within a particular state that manifests in ways other than affirmative action bans, 
such as hostile attitudes towards minorities that dissuades them from applying to selective 
intuitions or makes them feel unwelcome upon matriculation. These controls do not significantly 
change the estimators for White and Asian graduation rates.  
5.2. Effect of Affirmative Action Ban on Graduation Rates by Major 
The effect of affirmative action bans on minority and nonminority graduation rates by 
major categories are shown in Table 4 (Panels A – G). These results show that mismatch effects 
are strongest in STEM, but also significant (although effects are smaller) in the social sciences. 
Affirmative action bans increase Black and Hispanic six-year graduation rates by around two-to-
three percentage points in STEM and one-to-two percentage points in the social sciences. There 
are many spurious results in the “wrong direction” that are statistically significant but not 
economically meaningful, potentially due to very low sample sizes in some fields. Overall, my 
results do not support the hypothesis that mismatch effects, if present, are confined only to STEM 
majors. Intuitively, this means that minority students may have lower persistence rates in the 
sciences and social sciences vis-à-vis nonminorities, as Arcidiacono et. al (2012) estimate.  
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Table 4: Effect of Racial Preference Ban on Graduation Rates by Race, Selectivity, and Major Category 
Interaction 
Racial Group 
All White Asian Black Hispanic 
Panel A: Arts and Humanities 
Ban × Highly Selective 0.00118 -0.00285 -0.000684 -0.00291 -0.00163 
 (0.00488) (0.00504) (0.00438) (0.00861) (0.00893) 
Ban × Moderately Selective -0.00296 -0.00400 -0.00169 0.000476 -0.00175 
 (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00488) (0.00386) (0.00470) 
Ban × Unselective 0.000433 0.000161 0.00130 -0.00140** -0.00108 
 (0.00129) (0.00147) (0.00111) (0.000644) (0.000988) 
Panel B: Business 
Ban × Highly Selective -0.00609 -0.00977 -0.0109 -0.00666 -0.00133 
 (0.00823) (0.00728) (0.00805) (0.00541) (0.00823) 
Ban × Moderately Selective 0.00674 0.00462 0.0134 0.00580 0.00705 
 (0.00546) (0.00637) (0.0114) (0.00629) (0.00432) 
Ban × Unselective 0.000975 0.000382 0.00392** 0.00139 0.00289 
 (0.00123) (0.00132) (0.00183) (0.00279) (0.00173) 
Panel C: Health and Medicine 
Ban × Highly Selective 0.000732 -0.000310 0.00228 0.00306 0.00383 
 (0.00427) (0.00428) (0.00499) (0.00314) (0.00522) 
Ban × Moderately Selective 0.00468*** 0.00507*** 0.00881*** 0.00594** 0.00665*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00145) (0.00262) (0.00280) (0.00216) 
Ban × Unselective -0.000796 -0.00117 -0.000905 0.000893 -0.000314 
 (0.00138) (0.00147) (0.00130) (0.00155) (0.00124) 
Panel D: Multi-/Interdisciplinary Studies 
Ban × Highly Selective 0.000780 -0.00391 -0.00328 0.00797*** 0.00232 
 (0.00625) (0.00711) (0.00845) (0.00276) (0.00784) 
Ban × Moderately Selective 0.00208 0.00319 0.0135** 0.00889** 0.00133 
 (0.00372) (0.00419) (0.00585) (0.00394) (0.00592) 
Ban × Unselective 0.00874*** 0.00818*** 0.0103*** 0.00785*** 0.00873** 
 (0.00137) (0.00135) (0.00204) (0.00151) (0.00348) 
Panel E: Public and Social Services 
Ban × Highly Selective -0.00178* -0.00332** -0.00172 -0.00254 -0.00411** 
 (0.000985) (0.00154) (0.00146) (0.00176) (0.00167) 
Ban × Moderately Selective 0.00229 0.00173 0.00373 0.000830 -0.000405 
 (0.00238) (0.00252) (0.00237) (0.00165) (0.00207) 
Ban × Unselective -0.000353 -0.000469 -0.000122 -0.00144** -0.00268*** 
 (0.00106) (0.000998) (0.000631) (0.000609) (0.000654) 
Panel F: Science, Math, and Technology 
Ban × Highly Selective 0.0223 0.0170 0.0193*** 0.0255** 0.0350*** 
 (0.05566) (0.06007) (0.00655) (0.0112) (0.00659) 
Ban × Moderately Selective 0.00473 0.00264 0.0104 0.0184 0.0125 
 (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0163) (0.0128) (0.00994) 
Ban × Unselective -0.00383** -0.00440*** -0.00432 -0.00224 0.00296 
 (0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00333) (0.00231) (0.00291) 
Panel G: Social Sciences 
Ban × Highly Selective -0.00154 -0.00439 0.00262 0.0123*** 0.0177** 
 (0.00692) (0.00582) (0.00784) (0.00351) (0.00768) 
Ban × Moderately Selective -0.00634 -0.00793 -0.00154 0.00970 0.00723 
 (0.00716) (0.00693) (0.00826) (0.0115) (0.00780) 
Ban × Unselective -0.00954*** -0.0106*** -0.00612* -0.00187 0.00159 
Number of Observations 10,479 
Number of Institutions 499 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include State Trends, Percentage Plan, Voter Initiative, 
and Discussion Period controls. “Highly Selective” institutions are defined as those in the top 10% of selectivity by 
undergraduate admission rates, “Moderately Selective” as those in the top 10-20%, and “Unselective” in the bottom 
80%. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
14
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 17 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol17/iss1/3
 
 
6. Robustness 
For βj to capture the causal effect of affirmative action bans on minority graduation rates, 
the critical assumption in Equation (2) is that in absence of racial preference bans the average 
change in degree attainment rates would have been the same between institutions under ban and 
nonban affirmative action regimes. This is termed the “parallel trends” assumption. If the parallel 
trends assumption holds, treated and nontreated institutions will not exhibit materially differing 
time trends, implying that 𝛾𝑗, 𝛿𝑗, 𝜙𝑗 , and 𝜂𝑠 capture secular time trends affecting universities under 
ban and nonban affirmative action regimes. This paper probes the robustness of the difference-in-
difference estimation strategy using a synthetic control approach and a triple-difference estimation 
technique.  
6.1. Synthetic Control 
Following Abadie et al. (2010), I estimate a model in which an affirmative action ban (the 
treatment) effectuates at some point in time for a certain state but not in the pool of potential control 
states. I specify a vector of controls, and a “synthetic” control state is constructed whereby the 
convex combination of the potential control units most closely matches the treatment unit value of 
these variables. The synthetic control approach allows me to project graduation rates in the 
synthetic control into a counterfactual posttreatment period that approximates what would have 
happened to graduation rates in a state that had banned affirmative action if the affirmative action 
ban not gone into effect (Hinrichs, 2012). The synthetic control model is therefore:  
𝑔𝑠𝑡(0) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑔𝑗𝑡 
𝐽+1
𝑗 =2
 (3) 
Where W = (w2, w3, …, wJ+1)′ , with w2 + w3 + … + wJ+1 = 1. Each value of W represents a 
potential synthetic control. The objective is to select weights W such that ‖𝑿1 − 𝑿0𝑾‖ is 
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minimized, where X1 is a vector of pretreatment predictors, and X0 is the same set of predictors 
for the control units. I include institutional enrollment, family income, share of female students, 
average SAT scores, share of first-generation students, undergraduate admission rates, and four-
year transfer rates in my set of predictors. I then choose matrix V such that I minimize 
√(𝑿1 −  𝑿0𝑾)′𝑽(𝑿1 − 𝑿0𝑾) . The matrix V weights the variables used in synthesizing by 
minimizing the mean-squared predicted error in the entire pretreatment period.  
For illustrative purposes, I present results from California below. Figure 3 shows that racial 
preference bans increased minority graduation rates at highly selective public universities in 
California, but Figure 4 shows no significant effects for nonminorities. The increase in minority 
graduation rates from better matching is similar to what is predicted in specification (2).17  
  
6.2. Triple-difference 
As an additional robustness check, I reinstitute private colleges into the sample as an 
additional control group to construct a difference-in-difference-in-difference (triple-difference) 
model. The regression specifications presented in (1) and (2) may conceal how certain public 
universities are more affected by affirmative action bans than others. Comparing graduation rates 
 
17 Results for Moderately Selective or Unselective institutions, whether in California or in other states, appear very 
similar to what is shown in Figure 4. 
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at public universities in these ban states with public universities in states that have not banned 
affirmative action creates a potential complication: other factors unrelated to affirmative action 
bans may systemically vary across states. For example, nonban states may fund higher education 
less generously than ban states, or vice versa. Another approach compares public and private 
institutions (unaffected by statewide affirmative action bans) in ban states. The potential problem 
with this approach is that other factors unrelated to a newly implemented affirmative action ban 
may affect minority graduation rates differently at public universities vis-à-vis private ones. For 
example, private universities may consider “legacy” factors in admissions decisions while public 
universities might devalue or disregard nepotistic relationships. A more robust specification than 
either model could be obtained by using both a different state and different control type. This is 
the triple-difference estimation strategy. The model is therefore: 
𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑠,𝑡−6 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗  × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣)
3
𝑗 =1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗(𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑋𝑠,𝑡−6 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗  × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣) +
3
𝑗 =1
∑ 𝛿𝑗(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣)
3
𝑗 =1
+ ∑ 𝜙𝑗(𝑑𝑠(𝑡−𝜆) × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑗 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣) +
3
𝑗 =1
𝑣𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜂𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡  
(4) 
Where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣 is a binary variable indicating whether a university is coded as a private for-profit or 
private nonprofit institution across all years in the sample.                    
Overall, the triple-difference analysis tends to support the results of specifications 1 and 2. 
Table 5 presents the triple-difference results from equation (4). Results are consistent with the 
mismatch hypothesis, though the increase in graduation rates is 0.71 and 1.11 percentage points 
lower for Blacks and Hispanics, respectively, vis-à-vis specification (2) in Table 3, but results are 
still significant at the 95% confidence level. Compared to Table 3, the power of the estimate 
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increases for Blacks. Notably, mismatch effects can also be detected at moderately selective 
institutions (that is – those between the first and second decile of selectivity).   
Table 5 – Effect of Affirmative Action Ban on Minority Graduation Rates - Triple-difference Analysis 
   Racial Group 
Variables All 
Students 
White Asian Black Hispanic 
      
Ban × Highly Selective × Private 0.0123 -0.00789 0.00731 0.0294*** 0.0408** 
 (0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0218) (0.00934) (0.0159) 
Ban × Moderately Selective × Private 0.0185* 0.0120 0.0562 0.0500** 0.0407*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0360) (0.0243) (0.0147) 
Ban × Unselective × Private -0.00478 -0.00956 0.00697 -0.00935 -0.000672 
 (0.00977) (0.00941) (0.00728) (0.0114) (0.00774) 
Constant -6.847*** -7.845*** -10.52*** -6.589*** -8.897*** 
 (0.320) (0.395) (1.069) (0.786) (0.927) 
R-squared 0.125 0.118 0.032 0.035 0.034 
Number of Observations 28, 560 
Number of Institutions 1,360 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. State Trends, Percentage Plan, Voter Initiative, and Discussion Period 
controls are added in each regressive specification. “Highly Selective” institutions are defined as those in the top 10% 
of selectivity by undergraduate admission rates, “Moderately Selective” as those in the top 10-20%, and “Unselective” 
in the bottom 80%. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
7. Conclusion 
My findings suggest that minority graduation rates significantly increase after racial 
preference bans at highly selective public institutions, indicative of mismatch dominating college-
quality effects. In addition to STEM, mismatch effects are present, albeit to a lesser extent, in the 
social sciences as well. These results are robust to the inclusion of private institutions and affirmed 
by a synthetic control approach.18 These results are consistent with those of Hinrichs (2014) and 
Arcidiacono et. al (2014), who uses only UCOP data. My findings are not inconsistent with 
Hinrichs (2012, 719), who finds that “affirmative action bans have no effect” for the “typical 
student at the typical college” even though affirmative action programs may cause some students 
to “cascade down” the selectivity ladder. Only a small fraction of public colleges in ban states in 
 
18 These results diverge from Cortes (2010) – who also controls for percentage plan programs implemented in 
response to affirmative action bans – but Cortes restricts her sample to the state of Texas and does not distinguish 
colleges by selectivity. 
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ban years are highly selective, and I find no evidence of significant mismatch effects at unselective 
institutions, encompassing roughly 80% of the sample. 
In their review of the literature, Arcidiacono, Lovenheim, and Zhu (2015) articulated the 
empirical challenge of disentangling mismatch and college quality effects.19 My work joins Hill 
(2017), Hinrichs (2012, 2014), Arcidiacono et. al (2014) in answering this challenge. However, 
this paper is the first to find evidence for mismatch effects across two decades of IPEDS data at 
highly selective institutions. Moreover, no previous literature has examined whether mismatch 
effects are confined to a single major category at this nationwide scale. In finding that mismatch 
effects are present only at highly selective institutions and not confined only to STEM fields, my 
paper fills an important void in the literature.  
However, I must present these findings with two caveats. First, it is still possible that 
(particularly biracial) minorities may change their race reporting behavior in response to racial 
preference bans.20 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether and how a disinclination to report oneself as 
a minority after affirmative action is banned impacts the graduation rates of those who continue to 
self-identify as Black or Hispanic. Hill (2017) found that statewide affirmative action bans does 
not change the percentage of “race unknown” students in the IPEDS database. Additionally, Card 
and Kruger (2005) found no change in minority race-reporting behavior after affirmative action 
bans using SAT score-sending behavior as a proxy for minority interest.  
A more serious challenge to my interpretation stems from the fact that colleges and 
universities may themselves respond to affirmative action bans by investing more in minority 
 
19 Which, they note, Bound and Turner (2007) were unable to do. 
20 Again, Sowell (2004) suggests that some nonminorities may be encouraged to “redesignate” themselves as 
minorities following the enactment of race-sensitive admissions policies. 
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students following an inability to employ racial preferences in admissions decisions.21 For example, 
institutions may more aggressively implement special tutoring, support, guidance, or mentoring 
services targeted at or restricted to minority students after affirmative action is banned, which 
could increase minority graduation rates after a ban. In this case, collegiate responses, rather than 
mismatch, could account for the increasing minority graduation rates post-ban. Unfortunately, 
there is no good data in IPEDS to control for collegiate responses to affirmative action bans, which, 
I submit, may be a significant source of endogenous variation. One could control for this 
endogenous variation by extracting textual data from cached university websites describing 
targeted minority tutoring or support services (by year) and quantifying the extent to which 
universities help minorities more after racial preferences are banned. This is beyond my level of 
technical expertise, and public data on intra-university student support services may not even be 
available. Regardless, university responses to affirmative action bans could prove a fruitful 
direction for future research. 
The superheated public-policy debate surrounding the use of racial preferences in 
admissions decisions will continue.22 If there exists a racial imbalance in degree attainment rates, 
colleges and universities are prone to attempt corrective steps. However, this paper finds evidence 
that affirmative action programs may harm some of its intended beneficiaries. These results should 
not be taken as a larger indictment of affirmative action programs in general, as there are many 
other dimensions to affirmative action beyond mismatch not examined in this paper. Ultimately, 
the merits and demerits of affirmative action programs must be equally considered in deciding its 
societal utility as a program to rectify real or perceived racial injustice and historical discrimination.  
 
21 States have already implemented “percentage plan” programs to increase minority enrollment rates. 
22 Currently, Californian voters are deciding the fate of Proposition 16, a voter-led initiative to reverse the racial 
preference bans enacted by Proposition 209 and reinstate affirmative action programs. 
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Appendix 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used 
 Descriptive Statistics, Whole Sample 
Variables N Mean Median Min Max SD 
       
Six Year Graduation Rate, Overall 28,560 0.567 0.557 0.00340 1 0.178 
Six Year Graduation Rate, White 28,560 0.588 0.583 0.00230 1 0.176 
Six Year Graduation Rate, Asian 28,560 0.601 0.594 0.00460 1 0.228 
Six Year Graduation Rate, Black 28,560 0.468 0.439 0.00350 1 0.226 
Six Year Graduation Rate, Hispanic 28,560 0.525 0.500 0.00550 1 0.223 
Institutional Admission Rate 28,560 0.661 0.693 0.0473 1 0.189 
Majority Vote Dummy 28,560 0.0251 0 0 1 0.157 
Ban Discussion Dummy 28,560 0.0267 0 0 1 0.161 
Ban Dummy 28,560 0.0384 0 0 1 0.192 
Highly Selective Dummy 28,560 0.106 0 0 1 0.308 
Moderately Selective Dummy 28,560 0.0936 0 0 1 0.291 
Unselective Dummy 28,560 0.800 1 0 1 0.400 
Top X% Dummy 28,560 0.0805 0 0 1 0.272 
Public University Dummy 28,560 0.382 0 0 1 0.486 
       
Notes: Full sample (private + public) descriptive statistics from which other interaction terms are generated. The 
number of observations is denoted “N,” and the Standard Deviation is denoted “SD.” “Six Year Graduation Rates” 
are the percentage of full-time, first-time students at the university or within a specific racial group that graduated in 
six years or less. Certain institutions reported extremely low or extremely high (100%) graduation rates to the NCES.  
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics by Sample and Sub-Sample 
  Ban States  
Nonban States   Pre-Ban  Post-Ban  
Average SAT Score  1077.9 
(111.3) 
 1100.1 
(140.3) 
 1076.6 
(123.4) 
Average Six-Year Graduation Rate  51.3% 
(16.6%) 
 58.0% 
(18.0%) 
 53.7% 
(18.4%) 
Median Family Income  $49,672.7 
($15,504.4) 
 $59,728.6 
($20,061.6) 
 $57,612.1 
($21,491.0) 
Federal Student Loan Recipients  57.7% 
(14.4%) 
 53.4% 
(16.3%) 
 57.5% 
(18.0%) 
Share Female Students  57.3% 
(10.8%) 
 57.8% 
(10.5%) 
 58.2% 
(11.3%) 
Share First-Generation  35.4% 
(9.2%) 
 34.4% 
(10.6%) 
 34.7% 
(11.4%) 
Average Admission Rate  68.7% 
(17.2%) 
 61.2% 
(19.6%) 
 67.7% 
(18.6%) 
Six-Year Transfer Rate  8.0% 
(14.2%) 
 8.0% 
(13.7%) 
 7.9% 
(13.0%) 
Notes: Median family income is measured in real 2015 dollars. SAT scores are reported for admitted students, and 
scores after March 2016 are converted to the pre-2016 scale using concordance tables provided by the College Board. 
Transfer rates are measured for first-time, full-time students within 150% of the expected time to complete a four-year 
undergraduate degree. Total shares of enrollment are reported for first-time, full-time, undergraduate degree-seeking 
students. Data is from IPEDS (1997-2007) at the institutional level. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 8: Major Categories in the Eight-Segment College Board Classification Scheme 
Arts and Humanities Business 
Health and 
Medicine 
Multi-/Interdisciplinary 
Studies 
Arts, Visual, and Performing 
English Language and 
Literature 
Languages, Literatures, and 
Linguistics 
Philosophy and Religion 
Accounting and Finance 
Business Management 
Administration 
Human Resources 
Sales and Marketing 
Health Professions 
and Related 
Clinical Sciences 
 
Area, Ethnic, Cultural, and 
Gender Studies 
Family and Consumer Sciences 
Liberal Arts and Sciences, 
General Studies, and 
Humanities 
Multi-/Interdisciplinary Studies 
Parks, Recreation, and Fitness 
Public and Social Services Science, Math, and Technology Social Sciences Trades and Personal Services 
Law and Legal Studies 
Military 
Public Administration and 
Social Services 
Security and Protective 
Services 
Theological Studies and 
Religious Vocations 
 
Agriculture and Related Sciences 
Architecture and Planning 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 
Communications Technologies 
Computer and Information Sciences 
Engineering 
Engineering Technologies 
Math and Statistics 
Natural Resources and Conservation 
Physical Sciences 
Communication 
and Journalism 
Education 
History 
Library Science 
Psychology 
Social Sciences 
 
Construction Trades 
Mechanic and Repair 
Technologies 
Personal and Culinary Services 
Precision Production Trades 
Transportation and Materials 
Moving 
 
Notes: Major classification scheme used by the College Board, presented in an abridged version. 
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